From today's WSJ (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB113578440504233033.html?mod=economy_lead_story_lsc) (subscription required for link).
Economists Ask
If Bonds Have Lost
Predictive Power
By MARK WHITEHOUSE
Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
December 29, 2005; Page C1
Now that the bond market is behaving as if the economy is in trouble, investors who would like to believe otherwise need ask themselves: Is past prologue?
When yields on longer-term U.S. Treasurys fell below those of short-term securities Tuesday, they traced a pattern that often has been seen shortly before the economy trended lower or even tanked.
http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/images/OA-AB981_YieldC_20051228163622.gif But amid overall low interest rates and one of the most stable stretches of economic growth in U.S. history, many economists are saying the bond market must be wrong this time.
"I think the bond market is on drugs," says Ethan Harris, chief U.S. economist at Lehman Brothers in New York. "It's hard to take the yield curve seriously as a recession indicator." Even Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan has argued that the yield curve may have lost its oracle status.
Economic optimists also note that the "yield curve inversion" -- so called because it reverses the normal upward slope of bond yields, from short to longer term -- isn't yet severe. Indeed, in late New York trading yesterday, the difference in yield between two- and 10-year Treasury notes -- a popular measure of the curve -- had eked back into traditional territory. The two-year note's price was down 2/32 to yield 4.373%, while the 10-year was off 9/32, or $2.81 for each $1,000 in face value, to yield 4.376%. In other words, that snapshot of the yield curve was pointing ever so slightly upward again.
<reprintsdisclaimer></reprintsdisclaimer>Most market professionals, however, expect the inversion to return and deepen. And history has been brutal to economic forecasters who have doubted the yield curve's predictive powers. Over the past 50 years, the yield curve has given only two false signals, and the most recent head fake may have been caused by some very big extenuating circumstances: In 1998, investors spooked by a financial crisis in Russia and the demise of investment firm Long-Term Capital Management fled to the safe harbor of Treasury bonds. That pushed up the prices of those securities, and therefore drove down their yields, so low that long-term yields fell below shorter-term rates. But the economy survived, and even the swooning stock market righted itself.
When the curve last headed toward inversion in early 2000, with the yield on 30-year bonds falling below the yield on 10-year Treasurys, most of the major Wall Street banks saw little reason for concern.
Their rationale: The government, which was running a budget surplus at the time, was selling fewer long-term bonds, creating a shortage of those securities that pushed their prices up and their yields down.
For a bit of deja vu, consider a February 2000 report from Deutsche Bank: "When this spread went negative in the past, it either foreshadowed a recession or a sharp slowdown in growth in the immediate quarters ahead. Fortunately for Main Street, we do not think the 10s/30s inversion is sending us that message."
Four quarters later, however, the economy did indeed slip into recession.
This time, economists have some more weighty arguments against the voice of the yield curve. Chief among them is that long-term rates have remained extremely low for a variety of reasons unrelated to recession fears.
For one, foreign investors have piled into U.S. bonds.
http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/images/OA-AB977_WSJCOM_20051228161545.gif Second, as the U.S. population ages and companies or the government try to fund traditional pension plans, demand has grown for the kind of long-term bonds that can guarantee payments to future retirees.
Third, the Fed's success in controlling inflation over the past couple decades has led investors to demand less compensation for future inflation. All these factors have brought down long-term yields.
A recent report published by the Fed estimates that foreign buying alone has depressed the 10-year yield, which forms the basis for yields on corporate and mortgage bonds, by as much as 1.5 percentage points.
That means that consumers and companies can still borrow money cheaply.
Even the Fed's steady increases in its short-term interest-rate target over the past year and a half haven't brought it to a level that, by historical standards, would be considered a brake on the economy.
The rate now stands at 4.25%. However, dealings in the futures market suggest it will rise as high as 4.75% -- about 2.75% in real terms, or after inflation.
The average real Fed funds rate during the past nine yield-curve inversions was a much more restrictive 4.88%. Interestingly, the real rate was particularly low -- 2.74% and 3.68%, respectively -- during the inversions of 1966 and 1998, the last two times the yield curve gave false alarms.
That said, even today's interest rates could have more of an effect on the economy than they would have in the past, because U.S. consumers -- the engine of global growth -- are more indebted than ever.
Total household mortgage debt alone stood at $8.2 trillion in September, compared with $4.8 trillion before the last recession in 2000. As much as 45% of that mortgage debt is floating-rate, meaning that monthly payments rise when the Fed increases short-term rates, though often with a lag.
As the cost of mortgages goes up and cuts into demand for houses, consumers are hit with a double-whammy: They must make higher payments to stay current on their mortgages, and they can no longer supplement their spending power by borrowing against rising home values. A housing slowdown alone would hack away a big chunk of economic potential.
Write to Mark Whitehouse at
[email protected]<sup>6</sup>
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