Everyone knows Rondo's issues. His jumper is improved but still shaky, and teams ignore him in order to clog Boston's already so-so spacing. Yes,
Rondo has hit a career-best 48 percent on long 2-point jumpers this season, a number roughly comparable to those of elite mid-range shooters like Dirk Nowitzki and Chris Paul. But the numbers mask an obvious difference between those guys and Rondo: The jump shots of Nowitzki and Paul are weapons defenses attempt to take away by throwing extra attention at them, and weapons those shooters are comfortable using in high volume. Rondo's jump shot is a wide-open, last-resort look defenses are happy to provide if it means containing other action. Nowitzki might shoot 75 percent on equivalent looks at the hoop.
The shaky jumper means Rondo is of little use off the ball. This is one reason Boston has been unable to properly incorporate Jason Terry, shooting less often than ever and putting up the sort of usage rate we'd expect from a limited offensive player like LARRY SANDERS! Terry's shot selection has changed dramatically this season. Last season, about 26 percent of possessions Terry finished came via pick-and-rolls, with just 7.7 percent coming on Terry attempting a catch-and-shoot after taking an off-ball screen,
according to Synergy Sports. Those numbers have flip-flopped this season — 11.7 percent for pick-and-rolls, and 19.9 percent off screens. Going into the Miami game, Terry had attempted 39 shots out of the pick-and-roll, and only nine of them had come with Rondo on the court — even though the two started just about half the season together.
This isn't all on Rondo, as we'll get to later. But Rondo's game is a factor in what has happened to Terry in Boston. Ray Allen, ironically, was probably a better fit for Rondo's skill set. He's three inches taller than Terry with a quicker release, and those things make him more comfortable on the hyper-speed catch-and-shoot attempts that Rondo and Boston's system can create. Terry has been an elite spot-up shooter, but a lot of those looks in Dallas were of the stand-still type Terry could get as defenses bent toward Nowitzki down low.
Back to Rondo: He barely gets to the line and shoots poorly when he gets there. He occasionally looks for passes at the expense of easier shots, most recently when he opted against an uncontested fast-break layup in favor of a ridiculous failed lob pass in a game against New York that the Celtics ultimately lost by three.
Still: Executives around the league view Rondo as a max player or something close to it. He is perhaps the NBA's best passer, with a savant's understanding of how to create space and shooting opportunities for others via an extra dribble or a tiny change of direction. The rumors about his sour personality are true — there are hundreds of whispered "Rondo's a brat" stories floating around the league — but his talent and smarts are overwhelming. Which brings us to the other two reasons league observers pinpoint for Boston's offensive decline: roster construction and coaching.
The puzzling thing about Boston's scoring issues is that the Celtics have always been among the league's best shooting teams, from both 2-point and 3-point range. They just do everything else poorly. They have gotten to the line at average or worse rates. They are legendarily bad at offensive rebounding, mostly because Rivers — coaching alert! — prefers everyone get back on defense. They have been the league's worst turnover team over the last half-decade. And their shot-selection profile has been miserable.
Only two teams attempt fewer 3s, and only four attempt more mid-range jump shots. That is a recipe for failure, unless a team supplements those shots with something else — foul shots, fast-break points, etc. Boston does not.
This is where coaching and roster makeup intertwine. Talk to players and coaches about game-planning for Boston, and after the usual polite praise, they'll often mention how Boston lacks a big man who really enjoys setting screens and diving hard to the basket on the pick-and-roll, in the style of Tyson Chandler, Dwight Howard, and any number of lesser big men — Andre Drummond, Omer Asik, Robin Lopez, David West (a great screen-slipper), the old Amar'e Stoudemire, Amir Johnson, Glen Davis, and others.
Brandon Bass and Kevin Garnett are mid-range shooters. Garnett will occasionally take a hard dive to the basket, but he prefers to hold his picks for an extra beat or two, making sure he smushes the point guard chasing Rondo. And he obviously prefers to pop for mid-range jumpers rather than roll to the hoop.
The mere presence of a big man cutting hard to the rim opens up looks all over the floor. Think about all those open 3s Houston, New York, or Indiana get simply because weakside defenders, following common NBA defensive principles, have to crash into the lane to at least bump that rolling big man. Those wing players also get driving opportunities out of that action, as their defenders rush back to close out on them. This stuff is just not a frequent feature of Boston's offense, and that hurts.
Is that on Rivers or the front office? Or both? It's hard to say, since Rivers has sway in personnel decisions — including the trade of Davis for Bass. But there is growing chatter around the league that Rivers, while a very good coach, might need a top offensive coordinator to spice up Boston's stale offense. Rivers is a genius in bonding with players, getting them to buy in on defense, and drawing up plays out of timeouts, but Boston's general offensive look hasn't changed much as the league around the Celtics has evolved.